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Abstract 
This study attempts to predict aggregate profits for small and medium Romanian firms using a relatively naïve model. We use a 
dataset consisting of 4,519 observations spanning a period of eleven years, from 2001 to 2011. Each observation is obtained by 
aggregating the data associated with all small and medium firms that can be found for a given NACE and SIRUTA code in the 
greater Bucharest metropolitan area. Our sample includes a number of more than 1,514 observations that correspond to firms 
with aggregate zero turnover and aggregate zero number of employees. These are in fact shell companies, firms that are inactive, 
but somehow remained in the evidence of the Romanian Trade Register Office. We split our sample into two distinct periods, 
using the 2008 financial crisis as the dividing point. We fit a simple prediction model of aggregate total profits as a function of 
four variables, using the pre-financial crisis period. We test the predictions of our model using the post-crisis period. The results 
are imparting three important lessons. First, by allowing shell companies in our sample, the prediction accuracy of our model 
appears to weaken. Many surveys and economic policy studies conducted by the Romanian government take into account all 
companies in the evidence of the Trade Register Office, whether active or not. We thus strongly recommend that policy 
initiatives be based solely on statistical surveys that include only firms in operation. Second, we do not need very detailed 
information, a large number of explanatory variables, or a very sophisticated model in order to achieve a good prediction power. 
Using only four variables, our naïve prediction model boasts an impressive out-of-sample R-square of almost 62%. Third, the 
2008 financial crisis that wreaked havoc in Western Europe and North America, represented a true tipping point for the economy 
of the greater Bucharest metropolitan area as well. 
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1. Introduction 
Small and medium firms represent approximately 99% of all business enterprises in the European Union, and are 
responsible for employing up to 67% of the workforce, and generating up to 60% of the economic value added [1]. 
There is no question that entrepreneurship is one of the main forces driving economic growth and ensuring a 
dynamic and vibrant society [2, 3]. In Romania, small and medium firms have an average of 2.64 employees each 
and struggle to survive in a harsh, highly unstable, and unpredictable economic and political environment. The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 [4] suggests that Romania and Bulgaria are still in the early stages of 
capital accumulation.  It is not yet clear to what extent the reallocation of economic and financial resources ensures a 
healthy competition aimed at selecting the most productive and profitable firms [5, 6] nor is it clear the impact that 
labour and product market regulation have on innovation and overall profitability [7, 8].   
This exploratory study attempts to explain aggregate profits for small and medium Romanian firms using a 
relatively naive model. We use a dataset consisting of 4,519 observations spanning a period of eleven years, from 
2001 to 2011. Each observation is obtained by aggregating the data associated with all small and medium firms that 
can be found for a given NACE and SIRUTA code in the greater Bucharest metropolitan area. Our sample includes 
a number of more than 1,514 observations that correspond to firms with aggregate zero turnover and aggregate zero 
number of employees. These are in fact shell companies, firms that are inactive, but somehow remained in the 
evidence of the Romanian Trade Register Office. We split our sample into two distinct periods, using the 2008 
financial crisis as the dividing point. We fit a simple prediction model of aggregate total profits as a function of four 
variables, using the pre-financial crisis period. We test the predictions of our model using the post-crisis period.  
The results are imparting three important lessons. First, by allowing shell companies in our sample, the prediction 
accuracy of our model appears to weaken. Many surveys and economic studies conducted by the Romanian 
government take into account all companies in the evidence of the Trade Register Office, whether active or not. We 
thus strongly recommend that policy initiatives be based solely on statistical surveys that include only firms in 
operation. Second, we do not need very detailed information, a large number of explanatory variables, or a very 
sophisticated model in order to achieve a good prediction power. Using only four variables, our naïve prediction 
model boasts an impressive out-of-sample R-square of almost 62%. Third, the 2008 financial crisis might have 
wreaked havoc in Western Europe and North America, represented a true tipping point for the economy of the 
greater Bucharest metropolitan area as well. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data set and 
the methodology, together with the results of our regression models. Section 3 summarizes our findings and 
concludes. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
Our data set contains 4,512 observations of clusters of the firms officially in the evidence of the Romanian Trade 
Register Office headquartered in the Bucharest metropolitan area (Bucharest proper and Ilfov contiguous area) 
between 2001 and 2011. Each observation contains eight variables: A SIRUTA code (that is, geographical 
coordinates), the NACE code (that is, the code for the main object of activity of the firm), the total number of firms 
in each cluster, aggregate sales per cluster, aggregate profits per cluster, aggregate losses per cluster, the aggregate 
number of employees per cluster, and the year. Our sample includes a large number of shell companies, at least 
1,514 that can be unequivocally identified as such. It is quite possible that there are many more of them, but it is 
impossible to be accurate in their estimation, because an unknown number of shell firms could lay hidden among the 
clusters of active firms in each observation. In the end, we have decided against eliminating these observations from 
our sample, although we understand that their presence might distort some of the results.  
We want to explain aggregate profit per cluster in terms of aggregate losses, total number of firms, aggregate 
sales, and the aggregate number of employees per cluster. We hypothesize that if intense competition leads to a zero 
sum game, we should observe a significant relationship between aggregate profits and aggregate losses in each 
cluster. That is, the profits of the more competitive firms should be mirrored in the losses of the lesser competitive 
ones.  The other variables are used to control for other factors that are normally expected to influence economic 
results.  We also run a regression model in which the combined profit/loss is regressed against the total number of 
firms, aggregate sales, and the aggregate number of employees. 
 
Aggregate profits = Aggregate losses + Aggregate sales + Aggregate number of employees + Total 
number of firms 
 
Combined profit/loss = Aggregate sales + Aggregate number of employees + Total number of firms 
 
Because the economic and financial crisis of 2008 - 2009 had a dramatic impact on many firms and economic 
sectors across the world, we split the number of observations into two periods: The period 2001-2008, that is, the 
period before crisis (pre-crisis); and the period 2009-2011, that is, the period following the crisis (post-crisis). We 
want to compare and contrast the two periods and understand the extent to which the estimated coefficients and the 
fit of the model have changed. Moreover, we test the predictive power of the fitted pre-crisis model in the post- 
crisis period. 
The statistical software package used to conduct the econometric analysis is R, because it provides some of the 
most powerful and complete serial correlations tests available, a must when mixing longitudinal and cross-sectional 
data.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The distribution of firms, profits, number of employees, and 
sales are relatively skewed. In all instances there is a significant gap between the mean and the median. Moreover, 
sample standard deviation for all variables show significant variability. Among the firms who report profits, only a 
handful report significant amounts. A majority of aggregate profits are very modest, hovering in the neighbourhood 
of 40,000 lei, that is, $10,000 or so. This obviously translates into very small profits for each individual firm. 
Overall, the firms in our sample are barely able to break even. The median aggregate profit/loss is below 7,000 lei, 
or $2,000 per cluster. A majority of firms have fewer than 8 employees, although there are a handful of clusters with 
tens of thousands of employees. The number of firms per cluster is also very unevenly distributed. While there are 
clusters with over 7,000 firms, the median cluster has only two firms. 
Table 1. Sample statistics. 
 Min Max Mean Median Standard deviation 
Aggregate profits (Romanian Lei)  0  1,022,000,000  2,219,000 37,980  21,630,265 
Aggregate loss (Romanian Lei)  (974,287,253)  0 (1,872,488) (11,527) 27,402,389 
Aggregate profit/loss (Romanian Lei)  (974,287,253) 1,017,041,981 346,750 6,493 32,405,309 
Aggregate sales (Romanian Lei) 0 16,750,000,000 37,570,000 760,800 343,479,928 
Aggregate number of employees 0 52,351 161 8 1,125 
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Total number of firms per cluster 1 7,185 19,4 2 140 
      
      
 
The correlation matrix for our variables shows a strong correlation between the aggregate number of 
employees and aggregate sales per cluster (Table 2). In order to avoid the problems normally associated with 
possible endogeneity and severe multicollinearity, we run a two-stage regression. 
Table 2. The correlation matrix. 
Variables Aggregate sales Aggregate 
number of 
employees 
Aggregate Loss Total number of 
firms per cluster 
Aggregate sales  1 0.7702397 -0.3145987 0.1999793 
Aggregate number of employees   1 -0.5004945 0.3326488 
Aggregate Loss   1 -0.2411644 
Total number of firms per cluster    1 
 
We regress aggregate sales against the aggregate number of employees per cluster. The results are presented in 
Table 3. The residuals from this intermediary model are eventually included in our main model in order to isolate 
the influence of aggregate sales, net of number of employees. 
           Table 3. The intermediary model. 
Variables Aggregate sales 
  
Intercept -256182     
(t-value = -0.078) 
Aggregate number of employees 235357***        
(t-value = 81.107) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5932 
F-statistic 6578 on 1 and 4510 
DF,   
(p-value: < 2.2e-16) 
 
Main regression results are presented in Table 4. As expected, our models represent a very good fit. Both 
common sense and economic theory suggest that gross sales and the number of employees should be counted among 
the main determinants of economic results. Among the firms who report profits, the relationship between aggregate 
profits and sales on the one hand, and aggregate sales and the number of employees on the other hand is direct and 
significant. Another relatively trivial result shows that reported profits increase with the number of firms per cluster. 
The relationship between aggregate profits and aggregate losses per cluster also appears direct and significant. 
Smaller aggregate losses are associated with larger profits, and larger aggregate losses are associated with smaller 
profits. This seems to indicate a situation in which the tide lifts or sinks all the boats, rather than a zero-sum game in 
which the profits of some firms represent the losses of some others.  
Since our data set contains observations ranging from 2000 until 2011, we need to test for the presence of 
potential serial correlation. The “car” package in R estimates both the Durbin Watson statistic (with the 
correspondent p – value), and the exact autocorrelation at lag 1 [9] and [10]. In the first case, the autocorrelation 
coefficient is a mere 0.78%, suggesting that the pooled model we use has the appropriate specification.  
The second model seems to suggest an inverse relationship between the aggregate number of employees and the 
overall aggregate economic result (profit or loss). This finding is counterintuitive at a first glance, but could possibly 
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be explained by taking into account differences in productivity per employee among various firms, although we do 
not have the means to test for this rather speculative hypothesis. Another speculative explanation pertains to the 
presence of shell companies, although it is difficult to argue how their presence could produce such a result. The 
overall explanatory power of this second model, however, is lower, at 26% when compared to that of the previous 
one, at 60%. We have also tested a log specification of the same models after removing the shell companies. It 
appears that the explanatory power of this specification (not reported here) is better, but we have decided against 
endorsing this approach because the partial elimination of shell companies has been largely arbitrary, driven mostly 
by the constraints imposed by the specification of the log model.  
     Table 4. The Overall models. 
Variables Aggregate Profit Profit-Loss 
Intercept 522000* 
(t-value = 2.539) 
803400 . 
(t-value = 1.91) 
Aggregate Loss 0.03573*** 
(t-value = 4.135)  
- 
Residuals 0.0606*** 
(t-value = 64.751) 
0.07416*** 
(t-value = 39.010)  
Aggregate number of employees 8702*** 
(t-value = 40.303)  
-3317*** 
(t-value = -8.477)  
Total number of firms per cluster 18860***   
(t-value = 12.193) 
3936 
(t-value = 1.248) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6042 0.2615 
F-statistic 1723 on 4 and 4507 DF,   
(p-value: < 2.2e-16) 
533.6 on 3 and 4508 
DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.984 
(p-value = 0.238) 
(autocorrelation 0.0078) 
1.82    
(p-value = 0.006) 
(autocorrelation 0.09) 
 
In this second case, the Durbin-Watson test indicates a serial correlation of 9% (The Durbin Watson statistic has 
a value close to 2 and a p-value below 0.05), higher than in the first case but still low enough to be harmless,  
allowing us to pool the data without fearing any serious distortions of results. 
Last but not least, we want to understand how the economic crisis of 2008 has influenced the explanatory power 
of our model. We run a before crisis model and attempt to ascertain its explanatory power in the after crisis period. 
Results are presented in Table 5.  
     Table 5. The “Before crisis” models. 
Variables Aggregate Profit Profit-Loss 
Intercept 8.03600  ** 
(t-value = 2.798) 
1464000** 
(t-value = 2.823) 
Aggregate Loss 0.0113 
(t-value = 0.923) 
- 
Residuals 0.067***  
(t-value = 58.049) 
0.084*** 
(t-value = 40.999) 
Aggregate number of employees 8623*** 
(t-value = 32.375)  
-2661*** 
(t-value = -6.435) 
Total number of firms per cluster 20220*** 4806 
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(t-value = 11.017) (t-value = 1.457) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6374 0.3629 
F-statistic 1335 on 4 and 3031 DF,   
(p-value: < 2.2e-16) 
577.2 on 3 and 3032 DF,   
(p-value: < 2.2e-16) 
Durbin_Watson statistic 2.016261  
(p-value = 0.34) 
(autocorrelation -0.0082) 
1.946426    
(p-value = 0.068) 
(autocorrelation 0.027) 
In the case of the regression in which the dependent variable is the aggregate profit, the out of sample R-
squared equals -0.48; for the regression with profit/loss as dependent variable, the out of sample R-squared equals -
0.17. The after-crisis model is presented in Table 6. The Durbin-Watson statistics in Tables 5 and 6 show that the 
“pooled” model is appropriate for both “before crisis” and the “after crisis” data.  It is clear that the prediction power 
of the before crisis model is seriously weakened after the 2008 crisis. This most likely suggests important structural 
changes in the dynamics of the small and medium business sector in the Bucharest and Ilfov sector.  
Table 6. The “After crisis” models. 
Variables Aggregate Profit Profit-Loss 
Intercept 208000 . 
(t-value = 1.651) 
-313700 
(t-value = -0.478) 
Aggregate Loss 0.0264 *** 
(t-value = 5.044) 
- 
Residuals 0.0152*** 
(t-value = 16.083) 
-0.0042 
(t-value = -0.862) 
Aggregate number of employees 5111*** 
(t-value = 19.151) 
-14260***  
(t-value = -11.05) 
Total number of firms per cluster 32810*** 
(t-value = 14.256) 
70370*** 
(t-value = 5.893) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5367 0.07506 
F-statistic 428.2 on 4 and 1471 DF,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
40.9 on 3 and 1472 DF 
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Durbin_Watson statistic 1.795018  
(p-value = 0.018) 
(autocorrelation 0.094) 
1.760831    
(p-value = 0.016) 
(autocorrelation 0.1031) 
3. Concluding remarks 
Our research presents a rather intriguing picture of the small and medium sized companies headquartered in the 
Bucharest metropolitan area (Bucharest proper and the Ilfov area). We use a sample of over 4,000 observations, 
each one representing a cluster of firms corresponding the same SIRUTA and NACE code. We report aggregate 
profits only, aggregate profit/loss, aggregate number of employees, aggregate sales, and total number of firms for 
each cluster. The values taken by these variables depict an uneven situation. Among the many possible causes of this 
skewedness, one known to have a non-negligible impact: the sample contains at least 1,514 shell companies. There 
could be many more, but it is impossible to tell how many because many of them lay hidden in amid many other 
firms in each cluster. 
We explain aggregate profits only and aggregate profit/loss using aggregate sales, the aggregate number of 
employees, and the total number of firms per cluster. The model represents a very good fit, showing that a relatively 
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small number of explanatory variables account for a large portion of the variance in the explained variable. By 
splitting our sample into two sub-periods, before and after the 2008 crisis, we show that the model fitted before 2008 
has a much weaker explanatory power after 2008. This result suggests that significant structural changes might have 
taken place in the aftermath of the crisis. Finally, using a log specification that eliminates all known shell companies 
yields a better overall predictive power, yet we have decided against using this approach because purging the data 
set in this manner appears arbitrary. Although our study was conducted only on firms from the Bucharest 
metropolitan area and we cannot claim that our results can be generalized, we can hypothesize that in other regions 
as well the shell companies may have a similar impact on the overall view of the aggregate profit. As a consequence, 
we recommend that future economic policy analysis be conducted after excluding the distorting influence of shell 
companies, or at least after considering two comparative models: with and without these firms.  
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